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LABOR STRUGGLES, NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 
AND AMERICA’S FAVORITE PASTIME: NEW YORK 
WORKERS TAKE ON NEW ERA CAP COMPANY
 
VICTORIA CARTY*
 
Niagara University
 
ABSTRACT:
 
Contemporary economic globalization, which is driven
and regulated primarily by multinational corporations, has a direct impact
on workers’ lives. Trade agreements such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tend to be controlled by corporate interests in
the wealthy, industrialized nations. Those countries set the agenda to pro-
tect the interests of foreign investors and facilitate the mobility of capital,
but they do little to protect the interests of labor. In response, workers in
both the global North and South have been forced to rely on their own indi-
vidual efforts to protect themselves against unfair labor practices. This arti-
cle presents an in-depth analysis of a successful worker strike against New
Era Cap Company in upstate New York. The research builds on interviews
with union leaders, directors of nongovernmental organizations and other
community groups, and high school and college students who participated
in the struggle. The author situates this analysis within a social movement
framework to identify how power dynamics in the contemporary global eco-
nomic system can be contested at the local level. The changing social struc-
tures produced by economic globalization experience a convergence of
theories that explain both “old” and “new” social movements.
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Contemporary economic globalization, which is driven and regulated primarily
by multinational corporations (MNCs), has a direct impact on workers’ lives. Trade
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tend to
protect the interests of foreign investors and facilitate the mobility of capital, but
they do little to protect the interests of labor. Decentralized subcontracting arrange-
ments allow MNCs to constantly relocate in the pursuit of lower wages and lax
labor and environmental laws. The garment industry in particular has been experi-
encing economic restructuring worldwide, becoming a “borderless transnational pro-
duction network, having grave impacts on jobs, communities and industries locally”
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(Bonacich and Applebaum 2000:12). As production moves offshore at an acceler-
ated rate, workers are organizing to resist the race to the bottom, that is, the ten-
dency of MNCs to minimize workers’ rights and wages, thereby forcing them into
deeper poverty and isolation. Workers across the global North and South are col-
laborating with other activists across national borders, using networking and out-
reach to forge a globalization from below against corporate domination (Carty 2004).
This article presents an in-depth analysis of a successful worker strike against
the New Era Cap Company in Derby, New York, one of the poorest communities
in western New York (WNY). For decades WNY had been a signiﬁcant industrial
area. However, factory employment in the area has decreased by over one-half
since 1958, and employment in manufacturing jobs is at the lowest level in over
forty-four years (Hiestand 2002). As the manufacturing base continues to be deci-
mated, the population in Buffalo (in the heart of WNY) has dropped by 10 percent
in the past decade. Given this economic environment and the leverage that MNCs
have over local communities, the success of the Derby workers (the only union-
ized New Era plant) was all the more remarkable.
New Era is the most proﬁtable baseball cap manufacturer in the world and is
currently the only major producer of caps that still employs workers in the United
States. Originally a small, family-run enterprise, the company has grown over the
past several decades to become a multimillion dollar corporation. Therefore, if the
strike had not been successful and New Era had relocated, communities through-
out WNY would have been devastated. The struggle was successful because
activists adopted new strategies, forging alliances between unionists and other
worker-rights advocates and undertaking both a corporate campaign and grass-
roots community organizing.
I situate the analysis within a framework social movement theory. The litera-
ture on new social movements (NSMs) in particular allows us to conceptualize
the organization of grassroots efforts among workers, students, and other actors
to forge a multiclass and multi-identity coalition that was sustained throughout the
worker strike. I argue, however, that the emerging student anti-sweatshop move-
ment, which works in solidarity with the labor movement, combines organiza-
tional and identity features that social movement theorists tend to separate. I
focus on four aspects of the New Era mobilization efforts employed during the
strike: networks of support; tactics and strategies; framing and ideology; and
identity and emotions. The data I collected from interviews and surveys suggest
that the solidarity work that is taking place across coalitions is indicative of a new
type of social movement unionism that includes a large role for students and
other activists. The structural conditions within the local context aided in the cre-
ation of solidarity and collective identity and fueled the mobilization through a
collective action frame that workers, students, the community, and national and
transnational actors could readily relate and respond to. This sense of collective
identity, in conjunction with the various strategies employed and the alliances
that were forged, gave the challengers the necessary leverage over the corporation
to force New Era to agree to their demands.
I use a wide range of data to examine this case study, including in-depth inter-
views, surveys, newsletters, internal documents and memos, newspaper articles,
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and other primary and secondary sources. I interviewed the leader of the local
union, CWA 14177, and the area director of the national union that represented the
workers, as well as the directors of key nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and community groups that joined in solidarity with the workers in WNY. Some of
these interviews were in person and others were by phone. The information gleaned
from these interviews, which were mostly informal with a few standardized ques-
tions, helped me to reconstruct how the case unfolded and to understand the moti-
vation for resistance among those directly and indirectly impacted by the labor con-
troversy. I also relied on secondary sources to analyze dozens of student-conducted
interviews with workers that were documented in publications by United Stu-
dents Against Sweatshops (USAS) and the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC).
 
LABOR STRIFE IN THE U.S. GARMENT INDUSTRY
 
The garment industry has historically been a centrifugal source of tension between
workers and employers. There is abundant literature on the exploitation of workers
in the garment and textile industry (Bonacich 2000; Ross 1999; U.S. Department of
Labor 1996; Varley 1998). Sweatshops have proliferated in the U.S. apparel indus-
try since the1800s, when millions of immigrants, mostly from Europe, arrived
desperate for work (Commons 1997). Nearly two hundred years later, former Sec-
retary of Labor Robert Reich called sweatshops in the United States a “national
disgrace.” He noted that over one-half of the cutting and sewing shops in the gar-
ment industry pay less than the minimum wage and over one-third threaten
workers’ health and safety (Ross 1999:11). According to the General Accounting
Ofﬁce, over one-third of the apparel shops in New York and Los Angeles and
four-ﬁfths of those in Miami are sweatshops.
Part of the reason for these deteriorating working conditions is the mobility of
capital. This phenomenon began in the United States as early as the 1920s, when
New York ﬁrms began closing their own factories and contracted work to “foreign
zones”—poor areas of New Jersey and Pennsylvania (Ross 1999:14). In the 1950s
and 1960s U.S. corporations extended production to the low-wage and right-to-
work South, and then eventually overseas. Beginning in the early 1980s, the Reagan
and Bush administrations spent hundreds of millions of dollars promoting low-
wage offshore production in Central America and the Caribbean, which resulted
in a loss of 497,000 textile and apparel jobs in the United States. Apparel employ-
ment in the United States has decreased by 18.9 percent since 1980 (U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor 1996). In 1980, 70 percent of all apparel purchased in the United
States was produced domestically. Today, imports account for more than one-half
of the U.S. apparel market, and workers in the United States earn less in real
wages than they earned in 1955 even though they are twice as productive (Ross
1999:14). Workers in this industry also tend to be among the most vulnerable: 76
percent of all U.S. apparel workers are female, and 36 percent are members of racial
minorities (AAMA 1992).
Unionization has consistently been the most effective tool to combat sweatshops,
but its success has ﬂuctuated with political and economic changes. In 1910 over
forty thousand cloakmakers in New York sustained a two-month strike that
ended in an agreement between union and manufacturer representatives. The
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agreement, called the Protocols of Peace, helped to democratize the regulation of
the industry by mandating preferential hiring for union members, guaranteeing
workers’ participation in oversight of factory conditions, and instituting a joint
grievance procedure (Howard 1997:54).
Unionization efforts peaked during the mid-1960s. At that time over one-half of
the 1.2 million workers in the U.S. apparel industry were organized, and real wages
had been increasing for decades. In 1969, the largest apparel union, the International
Ladies Garment Workers Organization, had 457,000 members (Bonacich 2000:137).
By 1995, when it merged with the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union,
union membership was less than 200,000. Now less than 10 percent of workers in
the private sector belong to unions, and there are twenty-two states in which right-
to-work rules outlaw collective bargaining (Hayes 2005). The number of workers
belonging to unions today is at a sixty-year low; ironically, the percentage of people
wanting to join a union has grown from 30 percent in 1984 to 47 percent in 2004
(Hayes 2005). One reason many U.S. workers do not join a union is that 91 percent
of employers use managers to threaten and intimidate workers’ attempts to union-
ize (Varley 1998). Similarly, outside of the United States, garment workers’ organiz-
ing campaigns are often violently defeated (Quinteros et al. 1998).
 
NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNIONISM
 
Recent scholarship on NSMs has focused on how emotional bonds between activ-
ists help to forge and sustain collective identity. Research based on social construc-
tionist theory examines the emergence of NSMs, the trajectories of their growth,
and the strategic choices that NSM activists make, as well as how politics, ideol-
ogy, values, and culture motivate people into action (Kandermans 1994; Melucci
1996). At the heart of this research is recognition of a shared cognitive worldview,
or a sense of collective identity among the participants, that explains why people
are willing to invest time and energy in protest efforts. Polleta and Jasper (2001)
deﬁne collective identity as “a perception of a shared status or relationship, which
may be imagined rather than experienced directly, and is distinct from personal
identities” (248). Goodwin, Jasper, and Polleta (2001) suggest that when people feel
moral indignation, disrespect, and anger about perceived injustices, even those they
have experienced only indirectly, they may participate in social movements not
only to enforce policy change but, perhaps more importantly, to gain dignity. The
researchers further argue that without compassion, indignation, and moral shock,
the transnational movements against sweatshops, the World Trade Organization, or
the U.S. war against Iraq would have been narrower and less able to recruit people.
Key to forging collective identity is the way organizers “frame” their issues to
resonate with potential recruits and to interest the broader public in the hopes of
inﬂuencing public opinion and events (Benford 1993; Snow and Benford 1992). Por-
traying the reality and severity of a social problem by focusing on “suddenly imposed
grievances”—dramatic and unexpected events that highlight the problem—can
serve as a “pull factor,” raising consciousness and motivating individuals to join a
movement (Walsh 1981).
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Although collective identity and framing are key variables affecting the strength
and success of movements, there is no agreement among social movement theo-
rists regarding the consequences of social movements because direct causal re-
lations are very hard to systematically deﬁne (Earl 2004). Nonetheless, there is
empirical evidence that points to a few variables that impact the success of social
movements. These include taking strategic advantage of existing political oppor-
tunities, forming alliances and coalitions that expand the movement’s base of
support, and expressing a clearly deﬁned set of goals that movement supporters
can relate to. Cress and Snow (2000) propose that in order for a movement to have
an impact, it is necessary for organizers to employ resonant “prognostic” and
“diagnostic” frames, that is, to identify problems and pose solutions in a way that
mobilizes participants and appeals to third parties. Tilly (1999) argues that a
movement’s public displays of worthiness (or moral standing) are critical to a
movement’s impact, along with its unity, numbers, and commitment. Demonstrat-
ing that the suffering in question is “undeserved” is also crucial. It is important to
draw third parties into any social movements (e.g., the civil rights movement would
not have been successful if a signiﬁcant number of non-blacks had not worked in sol-
idarity with African Americans).
Social movements rarely achieve goals as a direct result of their actions. Gamson
(1990) proposes that successful outcomes occur either when the challengers’ goals
are realized or, more frequently, when the target of collective action recognizes the
challengers as legitimate representatives of a constituency, thereby altering the re-
lationship between challengers and target. And ﬁnally, Marullo and Meyer (2004)
deﬁne success as the challengers’ ability to change public opinion, force policy-
makers to alter their goals, and undermine the institutional or political infrastruc-
ture that support the policies they are in contention with.
Within the NSM literature there is increasing consensus that the organizational
structure of activism and the role of participants have changed, and therefore the
“newness” is a quality both of the social structures to which movements respond
and the forms of collective action themselves (Johnston 1994). The mobility of
capital and the decentralization of global supply chains, as well as the associated
novel power repertoires at MNCs’ disposal, are bringing forth a convergence of
multiclass- and multi-identity-based struggles. To understand the impact of these
changes on collective action, social movement theory is forced to rethink the rela-
tionship between the labor movement and NSMs (Smith and Johnston 2002; Keck
and Sikkink 1998; della Porta, Kreisi, and Diani 1999).
The labor movement is indeed beginning to recognize that in order to strategi-
cally respond to the race to the bottom and other difﬁculties it has experienced
over the last few decades, it must advocate a revival of “social movement union-
ism,” which combines militancy, union reform, and alternative forms of orga-
nizing (Voss and Sherman 2000:348). Social movement unionism calls for wide-
spread support from workers in various industries to work in solidarity with
community groups and other movements and to engage them in alliances in an
overall struggle for justice. Clawson (2003) argues that the labor movement must
form alliances with all oppressed peoples that are excluded from positions of
power. He states, “Labor must do more than build alliances; it must fuse with
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these movements such that it is no longer clear what is a ‘labor’ issue and what is
a ‘women’s’ issue or an ‘immigrant’ issue. . . . The only way progressive forces
will deal with the needed issues is if groups organize autonomously around
issues, identities and concerns” (pp. 194–95). Groups are thus encouraged to prac-
tice “solidarity without borders of any kind” (Moody 1988:95). In this way, they
can concentrate on the local concerns in a company or industry while also under-
taking joint organizing and participating in coalitions with other movements
(Brecher, Costello, and Smith 2000).
Thus, a goal of social movement unionism is to project a vision of an alternative
social system, one that sees injury to one as an injustice to all (Moody 1998). The
new movement examines how global issues have local effects on working class
communities, on the poor and on people of color, combining local strategies with
national and transnational strategies. This type of solidarity unionism operates
with local autonomy at the community level, while simultaneously advocating
worker solidarity globally. Such an approach acknowledges the nature of global-
ization while embracing a strategy that is applied locally (Munck 2000). This new
strategy requires labor to redeﬁne itself as a broad partisan force that encom-
passes local and national coalitions with a broad spectrum of social groups.
Social movement unionism is perhaps embodied most clearly in the new rela-
tionship between students and labor. University campuses have become one of
the most important fronts for the revitalization of the labor movement. Beginning
in 1995, United Needle Trades and Industrial Textile Employees (UNITE) and the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of International Organizations (AFL-
CIO) started training students in labor history and organizational tactics through
summer internships. During this time, students work as union staffers and repre-
sentatives on labor campaigns across the country. In 1998 some of these student
interns formed USAS as a campus-based movement to end sweatshop labor.
USAS is now a national student movement with chapters on over 180 campuses.
The networking between students and labor remains strong. UNITE underwrites
the cost of USAS national meetings each year. The AFL-CIO and the United Steel
Workers and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) also support
USAS ﬁnancially and logistically and have hired several USAS members to work
as researchers and organizers (Friedman and Tanniro 2003).
The SEIU, Hotel Employees Restaurant Employees, and Communication Workers
of America (CWA) have also utilized the revitalization of student activism to get
students involved not only in university campaigns but also in community,
national, and global politics. Through living wage campaigns, for example, labor
activists and students campaigned to unionize food service workers across the
country and have successfully pressured universities to remove Taco Bell from
nineteen college campuses because they fail to pay their tomato pickers a fair
wage (Moberg 2002). Student Labor Action Project and SEIU initiated the recent
successful Justice for Janitors campaign at Harvard University. The twenty-one-
day sit-in was also supported by the U.S. Carpenters’ Local Union, Jobs with Justice
(JwJ), and Harvard dining hall workers, who were in the middle of negotiating
their own contract and listed amnesty for the students as one of their demands
(Manners 2001). The AFL-CIO leaders staged a 1,500-person rally at Harvard, and
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their lawyers helped shape the students’ ﬁnal agreement with the administration
(Manners 2001).
Student and labor organizations have also engaged in successful international
campaigns. The coalition of USAS, United States Labor Education in the Americas
Project, Campaign for Labor Rights, the Maquila Solidarity Network, UNITE, and
other human rights groups, activists, and consumers organized in both Mexico
and the United States to assist workers achieve a victory at the Mexmode factory
in Puebla, Mexico, which licenses with Nike and Reebok. This is the ﬁrst factory
in the Mexican 
 
maquila
 
 industry to have an independent union (Carty 2004).
 
HISTORY OF THE NEW ERA CAP COMPANY AND 
BACKGROUND OF THE STRUGGLE
 
New Era is a privately owned company that is now in its fourth generation of
family owners. In 1920, Ehrhardt Koch opened the ﬁrst plant in Buffalo, New
York, to specialize in producing the Gatsby cap, a high-end fashion cap for men.
Ehrhardt’s vision was to run a family business, and in 1925 he hired his only son.
When the Gatsby went out of fashion in the 1930s, Ehrhardt began manufacturing
what he perceived would be a timeless commodity—the baseball cap. In the early
1960s the family opened a second plant in Derby, New York. It later opened a
third factory in Demopolis, Alabama, in 1998, and a fourth in Jackson, Alabama,
in 2000. New Era began offshore production in 2002, and it currently subcontracts
with plants in China and Bangladesh.
New Era is the largest supplier of baseball caps in the United States. The prod-
uct line consists of over one thousand cap models, and production exceeds 12 mil-
lion caps per year. The company has an $80 million contract with Major League
Baseball (MLB) and serves as its exclusive supplier of hats; 55 percent of its busi-
ness comes from MLB. It also supplies the National Basketball Association (NBA),
the National Hockey League (NHL), the National Football League (NFL), Little
League, and thirty-seven colleges and universities with its caps (http://www.
neweracap.com/about_nehistory.cfm). Over 8 million youth league, high school,
and college baseball players wear New Era caps as part of their uniform, as do
over two hundred PGA professionals during their tour play. New Era also sells
merchandise to the public through stadium vendors and hat stores.
Most revenue generated from the sale of baseball caps ($1.2 billion annually in
the United States) comes from imports, as production costs in the global South are
considerably lower. For example, unit labor costs for high-end caps manufactured
at the Derby plant are $2.80 per cap, but costs for the same cap made in Bangla-
desh come to only ﬁfteen to twenty-ﬁve cents (Lane 2001). Nonunionized plants
in the United States also have much lower production costs than do unionized
plants; at the New Era plants in Alabama, labor costs are $1.10 per cap. Thus, New
Era claims that foreign competition has forced it to cut costs and increase efﬁ-
ciency by diversifying production and outsourcing more of its manufacturing
base either to the southern part of the United States or to developing countries.
This has obviously caused concern among workers at the Derby facility.
Additional worker grievances began accumulating in the late 1990s: CWA
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.204 on Thu, 29 Jan 2015 14:00:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 246 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume 49, Number 2, 2006
 
charged New Era with violating federal labor laws and providing unsafe working
conditions. The company had also been cited for Occupational Safety and Health
Association (OSHA) violations nineteen times over a twelve-year span. Inter-
views with workers undertaken by the WRC found that repetitive-motion inju-
ries at the plant were over ﬁve times the national industry average and that
workers were consistently denied legal compensation for work-related injuries
(WRC 2001). Another worker grievance was the company’s deception about the
origin of its caps (Palmer Interview 2003). Workers at Derby were ordered to cut
out labels saying “Made in Bangladesh” and replace them with the New Era label.
The disclosure that ofﬁcial MLB caps were no longer being made under union
conditions in New York would have very important repercussions in the ensuing
labor struggle. It also helped to solidify student support and increase pressure
from many colleges and universities on New Era because making caps in Bangla-
desh is against their codes of conduct (Howald Interview 2003).
In 1997 the workers at the Derby plant had afﬁliated with the CWA to form
Local 14177. In doing so, they dismantled the former union, which had been cho-
sen and chartered by the company in order to appease the MLB, which stipulated
that it would only contract with a unionized workforce. Over the years, several
attempts by workers at Derby to join an AFL-CIO-afﬁliated union had failed
because of pressure from management. Also in 1997, CWA had initiated a cam-
paign to afﬁliate the union at the Buffalo plant (about ﬁfteen miles outside of
Derby) with the national union. At the Buffalo plant, 80 percent of the workers are
nonwhite, and many are recent immigrants who do not speak English.
In September of 2001 the National Labor Review Board (NLRB) ruled that New
Era CEO Fred Koch demonstrated a hostile attitude toward unionization efforts at
the both the Buffalo and Derby facilities by statements he had made to his man-
agement and employees and by surveillance of pro-CWA activity and the destruc-
tion of the organizers’ property. For example, after telling workers at the Buffalo
plant about the negative consequences of joining an independent union, manag-
ers offered to transport the workers to the voting site, which was just two blocks
away, and to pay for their time. The NLRB also found New Era guilty of intimida-
tion and of seeking to obtain favor with Asian employees at the Buffalo plant, who
were in the majority (Beddow 2001).
Management tried similar tactics at the Derby plant, but they were not success-
ful. Company ofﬁcials at New Era told the workers that their afﬁliation with an
AFL-CIO union could result in the plant’s closure and would terminate the “fam-
ily” nature of the enterprise (USAS 2001:6). In the weeks preceding the vote on the
CWA afﬁliation at the Derby plant, New Era ﬁred the union president and three
other ofﬁcers (Greenhouse 2001). Before the local union had formed, Koch sent a
letter to the ofﬁcers of the company union stating that the MLB contract was New
Era’s “life blood” and expressing fear of competition from offshore bidders. Koch
explained, “You, as union ofﬁcers, have the fate of 600 members on your hands. It
is your obligation to work with the company so that you can protect their jobs and
their livelihood’’ (Beddow 2001).
Another measure the company tried to invoke in retaliation was to demand a
vote on the decertiﬁcation of the new union. However, workers voted by a four-
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to-one margin to reject this campaign. New Era then announced it would lay off
125 CWA members, and that it had plans to lay off 100 additional workers within
the next six moths. There were 600 union members when the workers ﬁrst afﬁliated
with the CWA, but by 2001 there were only 450 (Howald Interview 2003). The com-
pany also reported that the work was being shifted to nonunionized plants in Buf-
falo and Alabama, where workers make about one-half the average wage of those
in Derby, and it also began outsourcing manufacturing to China and Bangladesh.
The old contract between the workers and management had expired December 1,
2000. Negotiations were stalled as New Era demanded concessions from the workers
that they found unacceptable. Under the company’s “ﬁnal” proposal, 70 percent
of the workforce would have undergone an average decrease in wages of ninety
dollars a week (Phillips 2001). The company also altered its efﬁciency standards,
meaning that employees would have had to produce more per hour to achieve the
same wage. Though management insisted it needed to increase efﬁciency to keep up
with international competition, at the time the Derby factory had a 98 percent on-
time delivery record (Hayes 2001). As the president of the local union, Jane Howald,
explains, Koch’s offer “would have spelled ﬁnancial and physical doom for its work-
force, coupling a transfer to engineered standards of production with a low base
wage, the elimination of years of accumulated COLA, no pension, no job security,
and no solution to a workforce hobbled by rampant repetitive-motion injuries. . . .
such an offer was insulting to our members . . .” (CWA press release 2002a).
The union viewed the offer as a manipulative attempt to legitimize outsourcing
to nonunion plants on the basis that management and workers could not reach an
agreement. They therefore rejected New Era’s ﬁnal offer by a vote of 238 to 10 on
April 21, 2001. In May, workers voted to strike (221 to 69), and they walked out
on July 16, despite the fact that “they had no idea how to run a strike” (Howald
Interview 2003). The CWA representatives actually tried to convince the workers
to explore other options, sure that the workers would lose their jobs to the nearby
plants in Buffalo and Alabama (Palmer Interview 2003). However, the workforce
felt so exploited and disrespected by the ﬁrm that they were willing to risk every-
thing. The stakes were incredibly high, as New Era was a critical source of employ-
ment in the county, and for much of the workforce it was the only life they knew.
In spite of this, the workers organized themselves “from scratch” to contest New
Era’s labor practices. “People who never voted for a union and who were resis-
tant to the idea of collective bargaining were on the picket line because the com-
pany had pushed them so far” (Howald Interview 2003). The workers’ sense of
collective identity and political mobilization was thus based not only on material
issues, but on a sense of moral indignity and the experience of being disrespected,
and over the next year this sense of solidarity and engagement in collective action
broadened to include hundreds of other activists at the local and national level.
 
THE MOBILIZATION
 
It was the support of these various participants that enabled the workers to
achieve their victory. The workers initiated the strike after asking for assistance
from and ensured the backing of a number of different groups with whom they
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would work in solidarity. These included student groups such as USAS and the
WRC; worker alliances such as the local and international CWA union, the National
Labor Union, and members of the AFL-CIO and other local unions; and commu-
nity afﬁliations that included JwJ and the Coalition for Economic Justice (CEJ).
In June 2002 the CWA announced that a tentative labor contract had been
agreed upon between workers and managers, under which New Era would raise
base wages by 4 percent and pay for an independent study of production quotas.
Base production rates were raised to $9.50 an hour, from the company’s proposal
of $9.10, with a ten-cent increase each year of the contract (Williams 2002). The
union voted in a four-year collective bargaining agreement in July 2002, after being
on strike for almost one year.
 
Student Involvement
 
Students got involved in the spring of 2001, when JwJ, a national NGO with a
strong local base in WNY, contacted USAS about the stalled negotiations. In March
2001 the CEJ (the local afﬁliate of JwJ) worked with USAS to bring a national dele-
gation of USAS students at the Derby plant. After interviewing dozens of
workers, USAS published a report revealing that “these testimonies . . . reﬂect a
community with a deep sense of pride in their work and a tremendous commit-
ment to the well-being of a company they have helped build over the course of
generations. . . . New Era’s effort to oust Local 14177 and punish workers who uti-
lize the union-negotiated grievance procedures and disability beneﬁts, is no dif-
ferent from the behavior of other sweatshop companies, except perhaps that their
attack on unions is more vigilant” (USAS 2002:12).
The report also revealed that workers were told on numerous occasions that
joining the CWA union would cost them their jobs because the factory would
close. In May 2001 workers ﬁled a formal complaint with the WRC, alleging viola-
tions of university codes of conduct. The CEJ worked with the WRC to recruit
professional investigators to inspect the plant and interview workers. The WRC is
a nonproﬁt, independent monitoring organization, established to help colleges
and universities enforce their manufacturing codes of conduct. It released a pre-
liminary report in August of 2001, depicting signiﬁcant problems related to free-
dom of association and health and safety issues. The report, which remained
“preliminary” because New Era had refused to meet with the assessment team
and to respond to the WRC’s concerns, stated that management “. . . had not
accepted its responsibility, under law and codes of conduct, to work in good faith
with the union representing the Derby workers, resulting in signiﬁcant violations
of workers’ associational rights. . . . New Era has not implemented a minimally
adequate program to protect workers from injury and illness in the workplace . . .
[and] the president, managers, and supervisors are imbued with anti-union ani-
mus to an extraordinary degree.”
Ironically, in the midst of the controversy, New Era applied for admission into
the Fair Labor Association (FLA). The FLA is made up of corporations and student
and human rights groups that are afﬁliated with various colleges and universities.
Being a member of the FLA certiﬁes that licensors are upholding agreed-upon codes
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of conduct. Thus, New Era’s membership would have appeased any concerns among
FLA-afﬁliated schools about the company’s labor practices. New Era was in jeop-
ardy of losing contracts with four hundred schools if it did not receive FLA
approval. Thus, the CEJ began to work with the AFL-CIO in lobbying FLA board
members to vote against admitting New Era into their program. CWA contacted
the president of the National Consumers League, recommending that the FLA
Monitoring Program deny FLA membership to New Era (CWA document 2002b).
The president of the national CWA ofﬁce, Morton Bahr, also wrote to the presi-
dent of UNITE asking that s/he (UNITE’s president) lobby board members repre-
senting some of the most inﬂuential companies on the FLA committee (PPMWS
document 2001). He speciﬁcally suggested pressuring the CEOs of Liz Claiborne,
Levi Strauss, and Phillips-Van Heussen, all of which had recently conceded to activ-
ists’ demands to improve working conditions and ensure freedom of association
in their offshore manufacturing plants. The letter argued that New Era had failed
to show a real intention to adopt the FLA Workplace Code or to implement a moni-
toring program consistent with FLA’s principles. Bahr noted that Koch had dis-
missed the WRC preliminary report as a set of “baseless allegations” and “so bla-
tantly absurd as to be unworthy of consideration” (PPMWS document 2001). The
letter further stated that Koch’s denial of ﬁndings, both those of the NLRB judge
and those of the OSHA investigation, as well as his claim that all of its collegiate
production was from U.S.-based plants, is indicative of the dishonesty of New Era.
In December of 2001, CWA Area Director David Palmer circulated a letter to
union members with a list of all local schools that had a contract with New Era.
He encouraged the parents of children attending any of the schools to write to
that school noting their disapproval of the labor dispute at the plant. Networking
at the grassroots level between workers and college students was also aggres-
sively pursued. Students attended CWA rallies at the University of Buffalo and at
the factory, and UB students petitioned their president to suspend the university’s
licensing contract with New Era. The NLC, in conjunction with the CWA, USAS,
and the United Steel Workers, brought workers from Bangladesh to speak about
conditions workers face in New Era factories overseas. The NLC also coordinated
with the AFL-CIO for delegations of USAS members to visit factories in develop-
ing countries. These educational and cultural exchanges proved critical for
increasing awareness of the local/global connection, helping participants to real-
ize that sweatshop conditions are not exclusive to the developing world.
Student activists also created sample letters and made them available online for
students and other activists to send to factories that were violating labor codes
and to university administrations that were doing business with such factories.
They also provided press materials for students to use in mobilizing local media,
and a sample resolution for university governing bodies that called for the rehir-
ing of laid-off workers and for the return of New Era to the bargaining table in
good faith (www.usasnet.org). In the USAS “Action Plan for the New Era Strug-
gle,” students identiﬁed a number of long-term goals. These included the follow-
ing: make sure Local 14177 always knows what students are doing; show the con-
nection between New Era and Kukdong [a Korean apparel company exploiting
maquila workers in Mexico]; strengthen links between students and the CEJ in
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Buffalo; bring to light the situation of New Era factories abroad; make sure the JwJ
conference will include something on New Era; have students send support let-
ters to New Era workers; encourage students to throw beneﬁt parties for the
workers; and follow up with the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center in Bangladesh con-
cerning labor practices at the New Era facility there. This list clearly demonstrates
an intentional strategy to coordinate student and labor concerns, agendas, and
mobilizing strategies to form a broad movement around a global issue to be con-
tested at the community level.
In the fall of 2001, in response to student pressure, Duke, Georgetown, Univer-
sity of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, the University of Wisconsin at Madison, George
Washington University, and the University of Iowa either ended their contracts
with New Era or postponed the renewal of their annual licensing agreements
until the company responded to accusations. Students from Ohio State University,
the largest university buyer, called CWA’s Palmer during the ﬁnal negotiations
with New Era. They stated that if an agreement was not made that night, they had
assurance from their administration that their university’s contract would be sus-
pended. According to Palmer, this helped clinch the settlement (Palmer Interview
2003). Intervention by university licensors and students also inﬂuenced Koch to
cooperate with the WRC and allow its members unrestricted access to the facility
and interviews with management. In the follow-up visit in 2002, the WRC con-
cluded that remediation at Derby had been “extensive and sincerely motivated by
the desire of New Era management to cooperate with the workers, with the WRC
and with the university licensors” (WRC 2002:19).
The student/worker alliance was successful in part because the diagnosis of the
problem was consistent with what the targets of recruitment themselves per-
ceived in their immediate surroundings. The reports issued by USAS and the
WRC helped demonstrate the “undeserved suffering” of the workers and their
“worthiness” as a group of people who were exploited and needed support. The
workforce was portrayed as dedicated and committed, yet consistently ill and
injured as a result of the inadequate health and safety provisions documented by
OSHA. They were also depicted as subject to gross intimidation for exercising the
legal union-regulated grievance procedures, as documented by the NLRB. New
Era, on the other hand, was found guilty on several counts of violating federal
labor laws and refusing to bargain in good faith or meet with independent moni-
tors. The publication of these reports, their distribution to college licensors and
presidents, and the lobbying power of FLA members jeopardized New Era’s
existing contracts. This gave the workers and students the leverage they needed
to force New Era back to the bargaining table and eventually allowed the WRC
full access to the facilities at Derby. Thus, the movement was a success because the
participants in the struggle were ultimately viewed as legitimate and were there-
fore able to force New Era to accommodate their demands.
 
Worker Alliances and Community Activism
 
The most obvious form of protest against New Era involved local union mem-
bers and other activists who marched on the picket line and held rallies. Workers
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representing Civil Service Employees of American, United Automobile Workers
(UAW), the Teamsters, the Iron Workers, the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees, the CEJ, CWA, USAS and dozens of local residents
accompanied the marching wcorkers and helped draw media attention to the
strike, all of which ultimately transformed the struggle into a national campaign.
CWA formed a Mobilization Outreach Committee to coordinate community activ-
ities. Printing, Publishing and Media Workers Section (PPMWS) members also
worked with the district and community coalitions to assist the local, which al-
lowed CWA to expand its publicity campaigns and utilize paid advertising (CWA
document 2001). The strikers received material and ﬁnancial assistance from the
American Legion, local unions, and peace organizations. A local UAW set up and
stocked a food bank for the striking marchers (including cereal and diapers, as
many of the workers were single mothers), and local vending companies and res-
taurants provided refreshments. Much of the motivation for assisting the workers
came from a genuine sense of moral outrage over how the workers were treated.
In Howald’s words, “the local activists were unbelievable . . . they bought into the
idea of workers being used up, abused, and treated as expendable” (Howald Inter-
view 2003). This collective identity of the workers and their supporters was built
on emotional ties and a shared sense of injustice that cut across class interests.
The union-busting activities of a large MNC against the labor force pitted the
company against the local population. Because New Era had historically been an
integral part of the community and hired such a large percentage of the popula-
tion, the strike produced much friction among the workers themselves (Howald
Interview 2003). In fact, New Era aggressively recruits entire families to work at
the plant, using this monopoly as leverage to secure worker loyalty and dependence
on employment opportunities. Because some of the employees were related by
blood or marriage (in 2001 the workforce included forty-ﬁve married couples),
the layoffs had a devastating impact on both individual families and the entire com-
munity. This only bolstered the image of undeserved suffering and made the workers
seem all the more worthy of support. The unity between the workers and other
activists, their sheer numbers, and their dedication to the cause strengthened the
level of solidarity and tarnished the image of New Era as a “family-oriented” com-
pany. In this instance the movement was successful in altering public opinion.
This also supports Fantasia’s (1988) argument that communities, ideology, and
consciousness are made and remade in the process of contention. Reﬂecting on his
research on labor conﬂict, he explains, “Workers then engaged in new forms of
activity (militant, direct action), created new associational bonds in practical forms
(essentially emergent social movements), and developed new-found values of
mutual solidarity (a new sense of ‘us’, a new sense of ‘them’), and emergent moral
sensibilities about the values associated with them each” (pp. 232–33). One of the
most meaningful activities that the workers at the Derby plant engaged in to
enhance their solidarity and deﬁne themselves in opposition to the target of their
protest was what they called “scab time.” When nonunionized workers who had
broken the picket line got off their shifts, the protesters outside of the factory would
chant, play music, sing songs, and engage in other types of theater to emphasize
their resolve in the struggle.
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In spite of the antagonistic nature of the struggle, the workers endured and
used their time productively at all times during the strike. When not walking the
picket line, workers were writing letters to politicians and the CEOs of New Era’s
retailers and their manufacturers. They attended weekly meetings to learn about
labor history and the interconnectedness of their struggle with the global econ-
omy. Increasing worker awareness of larger issues proved invaluable to the strug-
gle. According to Maria White, director of the CEJ, prior to understanding more
about NAFTA, many WNY workers had a protectionist view in that they felt that
people in the developing world were taking their jobs. She explains that “the
workers were in a cocoon, perceiving the problem to be one exclusive to their own
life in upstate New York” (White Interview 2003). One worker, Terry Hilburger,
reveals that when Koch told her to vote against the CWA or else New Era would
“go global,” she had no idea what he meant. “I thought, oh good, we’re going to
get orders from everywhere, lots of work in the plant. It’s not what he meant.
‘Global’ meant getting people in Bangladesh to make caps for 89 cents. Now we
know better. They’re making millions here, but they want more millions. That’s
the bottom line” (USAS 2001:9). Through consciousness-raising about what Walsh
(1981) calls “suddenly imposed grievances,” workers became empowered by join-
ing in solidarity with other local activists to address a global issue that was
impacting the local community.
In a local press release, Howald spelled out the local/global connection and
explained how the dictates of global capitalism and the power of MNCs affect
local communities and individuals: “In a year, our plant alone brings in $36 mil-
lion for the company—enough to double the pay of everyone . . . . [T]his company
is rolling in money and screwing its workers to make even more. It’s corporate
greed at its worst. And it’s devastating our community, where the ofﬁcial govern-
ment poverty level for the region is $29,000 for a family of four. Here where we
live, 40% of the households are below the poverty rate and New Era wants to
drive it even lower.”
The CEJ, the local afﬁliate of JwJ, also played an integral role in the victory. Its
philosophy sums up the agenda of social movement unionism: the social justice
movement should work in permanent and lasting coalitions not based on exclu-
sive issues (White Interview 2003). JwJ serves as an umbrella organization that
unites labor and other organizations ﬁghting for issues such as criminal justice
reform, immigrant rights, farm workers rights, health care rights, and civil rights
under a broad commitment to social justice. The organization is made up of both
member organizations and thousands of individual activists who strategize to
build a base of diverse constituencies at the local level, while providing training
coordination and networking at the national level.
One of the strategies JwJ employs is to distribute pledge cards by which the
signers agree to support other groups’ struggles at least ﬁve times a year. From
the information supplied on the pledge card, the CEJ creates an activist database,
which it uses to send online rapid response and action alerts about upcoming issues.
This strategy allowed workers at the Derby factory to establish local and international
solidarity with other actors by attending and helping organize events outside of their
speciﬁc struggle. Derby workers, for example, attended anticorporate globalization
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demonstrations at the Peace Bridge (linking New York and Canada), assisted
in labor struggles involving health care workers at the Sheridan Manor Nursing
Home in WNY, attended legislative town hall meetings, rallies, and council meet-
ings concerning Buffalo’s living wage, and regularly attended CEJ meetings.
According to White, the pledge encourages reciprocity in order to link workers’
rights struggles with the larger campaign for economic and social justice, creating
a network of local coalitions that connect labor, faith-based, community, and stu-
dent organizations (White Interview 2003). In recognition of the Local CWA 14177
union’s ability to work in this spirit, the CEJ awarded its members with the Nor-
man Harper Award for embodying “the hope that was created at the WTO pro-
tests in Seattle in 1999 whereby numerous and diverse groups found the ability to
collectively organize around a common enemy—global corporate domination in
all spheres of life. Solidarity must be extended to envelope all of those who are
struggling for social and economic justice, and CWA 14177 has done this better
than any labor organization in Western New York. It is because of this outreach
that many groups outside the labor movement have embraced the campaign at
New Era as a national movement of paramount importance.”
The grassroots efforts that emerged to support the striking New Era workers
exempliﬁed many of the strategies embraced by other NSMs, such as autonomy
and democratization, decentralization, egalitarianism, and ad hoc policies. The
pledge system allows activists to engage in struggles with which they share a
vision of global justice, but without formally afﬁliating with any particular orga-
nization. The CEJ and JwJ provided an overarching forum for the exchange of
information and communication among activists that helped expedite the cam-
paign and enhance coalition building. Heterogeneous groups got involved in the
New Era struggle from different angles, which helped build an infrastructure that
gave the community a sense of its own power. The sense of empowerment and
agency came only after concerted efforts to educate the workers and the commu-
nity about the global economy through consciousness-raising, information exchange,
and solidarity. These types of networks bridge old and new movements because
they necessarily have to address issues that cut across class dimensions and are
not based on single issues. Rather, they are anchored in a sense of reciprocity
across issues and borders in order to support speciﬁc struggles as they arise.
 
OTHER TACTICS
 
Activists also disrupted the point of consumption. Members of the AFL-CIO,
CWA, and the NLC from all over the country sent letters to New Era and the com-
missioners of professional sports leagues. CWA distributed letters to businesses
in the WNY community, encouraging them to write Koch to urge him to reverse
the layoffs and settle the contract. They also asked local businesses to write the
commissioners of the various professional sports leagues and describe how
the company’s actions impacted WNY. The legislative body of Erie County, which
adopted a resolution supporting the struggle at New Era (and sent copies to all
major professional sports league commissioners), also sent a letter to New Era
requesting that it rehire the 125 laid-off workers, cancel its plans to lay off addi-
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tional workers, and negotiate in good faith. Labor union members from the AFL-
CIO and International Workers of the World, as well as college students from the
University of Pittsburg and Carnegie Mellon University, attended several board
meetings of the Sport & Exhibition Authority, which owns the Pittsburg Pirates.
They convinced the authority’s board of directors to write a letter to the Pirates
urging MLB ofﬁcials to sever the league’s contract with New Era (Barnes 2002).
Donald Fehr, executive director of the Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion (MLBPA), contacted MLB and wrote a letter to New Era CEO Koch stating,
“For years, Major League players have been proud to wear high-quality, Ameri-
can-made, union label caps as the representatives of our national pastime, and to
lend our ‘player’s choice’ trademark to New Era caps produced under license for
our group licensing program. Under these circumstances, however, we may reas-
sess that judgment.” Responding to a request by CWA, Senator Charles Schumer
of New York wrote a letter to Allan Selig, the MLB commissioner, asking him to
suspend New Era’s production license based on the NLRB ruling. This letter was
also signed by congressional representatives Hillary Clinton and Ted Kennedy.
Activists also leaﬂeted outside of major retail stores and residential areas around
the homes of New Era executives and managers, including Koch (Cash-dollar
Interview 2003). The activists’ growing repertoire also included creative and sym-
bolic forms of protests such as consciousness-raising efforts during sporting
events. Protesters leaﬂeted and organized ﬂyovers at MLB games, picketed the
World Series, and disrupted Buffalo Saber hockey games and local golf tourna-
ments. One local hired an airplane to ﬂy a “Don’t Buy New Era Caps” banner
over the All-Star Game. In a unique ruse, the Local 14177 entered two basketball
teams made up of striking workers for the New Era cosponsored “Tops Shooter’s
Roundup” basketball tournament. The disruption of baseball games, America’s
favorite pastime, had a particularly symbolic and ironic dimension to it. Ballparks
are obviously ﬁlled with New Era products, and they proved a critical site for
activists to increase awareness of the problem. By exposing the true origins of
much of the company’s merchandise and the sweatshop conditions overseas and
locally, the movement seriously endangered New Era’s image as a company that
cares about providing good jobs for American workers.
Union members and activists also distributed, all over WNY, ﬂyers and caps
with a “Don’t Buy New Era” slogan that parodied the symbolism of the New Era
logo. The logo, which symbolizes the American ﬂag, is meant to represent New
Era’s employment of American workers. Union members designed ﬂyers that
depicted blood dripping over an 
 
X
 
 across a New Era Cap. The caption read, “New
Era Cap Company—A Major League Disaster.” The ﬂyers also provided informa-
tion regarding the domestic and international sweatshop conditions that the com-
pany was operating under, and its deception regarding the origin of the caps.
They noted that the workers had national support from the AFL-CIO, USAS, the
MLBPA, elected ofﬁcials throughout New York, religious and community groups,
and several universities that had suspended their licensing contracts. The ﬂyers
further charged that New Era’s description of itself as an American manufacturer
“should be more than just a sales pitch.”
These ﬂyers were very instrumental in framing the issue in a way that drew
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widespread support. They portrayed the issue as both a global and a local prob-
lem that was hurting those inside and outside of the community, and that this was
a direct result of corporate greed. The ﬂyers also publicized the fact that New Era
was being resisted on several fronts. Thus, the mobilization efforts included both
instrumental and symbolic forms of resistance and tactics. Participants engaged in
both a corporate campaign to boycott New Era and sustained grassroots commu-
nity mobilization that worked in solidarity with national and international actors.
Thus, framing, collective identity, and emotional ties worked in conjunction with
effective mobilization strategies. Letters from third parties including politicians,
commissioners of professional sports (in particular the letter from the director of
the MLBPA), and retailers strengthened the position of the workers and clearly
gave them inﬂuence over the settlement. Through symbolic forms of protest, activ-
ists were militant yet able to gain sympathy from much of the public by tarnishing
the image of a highly visible MNC.
 
CONCLUSION
 
The ideological frame expressed by the workers, students, and other activists in
the New Era campaign, that people should matter more than proﬁts, is shared by
many Americans. A poll taken in 1999 by the Program on International Policy
Attitudes at the University of Maryland shows that most Americans are unhappy
with the direction globalization has taken:
 
54% said US trade policy makers consider the concerns of MNCs too much.
72% said they were giving too little consideration to working Americans.
88% agree that increasing international trade is an important goal for the US,
but it should be balanced with other goals, such as protecting workers, the
environment, and human rights—even if this may mean slowing the growth of
trade and the economy.
74% agreed that if people in other countries are making products that we use,
this creates a moral obligation for us to make efforts to ensure that they do not
have to work in harsh or unsafe conditions.
75% aid they would be willing to pay $25 instead of $20 for a piece of clothing
that is certiﬁed as not having been made in a sweatshop. (PIPA 1999)
 
Given this sentiment, the mobilization of citizens is key to the labor move-
ment’s revival. To combat poor working conditions, the labor movement must
come to embody a broad partisan force that encompasses a wide spectrum of
social groups. It must attempt to fuse with other NSMs while maintaining a class
vision in order to form a new class politics. This case study adds to the explana-
tory power of social movement theory by reﬁning our understanding of how col-
lective identity can be forged and maintained across class- and issue-based bound-
aries in an all-encompassing struggle for social justice. In the New Era action,
activists strategized to take advantage of new opportunities created by emerging
social structures with novel forms of collective action. This research conﬁrms
Clawson’s suggestion that “A set of militant workers, with good organizers,
building broad alliances, and targeting a high-visibility employer might create
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a confrontation and win a victory that would change the terrain and become a
model inspiring others” (Clawson 2003:201). That the challengers knew how to
confront an organization while gaining sympathy for workers played a key role
in this struggle and set it apart from other struggles. By exposing the hypocrisy
behind the company’s marketing ploys and its projected image as an American
company that fosters a “family environment,” the protestors gained support by
using strategic and symbolic forms of protest to disrupt the points of both pro-
duction and consumption.
The framing of the central issue as one of corporate greed that was affecting
workers in both the North and South conﬂated economic and ethical concerns;
everyone is subject to economic, social, and cultural exploitation under the current
arrangements. Whatever their speciﬁc afﬁliation, the challengers in this struggle
all shared a common vision, sense of values, ideology, emotions, and politics, and
all of these factors played a role in this mobilization for economic security, human
dignity, and community well-being.
Whether or not this model can be replicated is questionable, for there were a
few things that made this struggle unique. For example, the popularity of sport in
U.S. culture played a role. Baseball and baseball caps are omnipresent in U.S. soci-
ety, and therefore the boycott made the issue easily identiﬁable and caught the
interest of the national media. More mundane products that cannot be easily or
symbolically tied to social injustice, or that are not as visible in everyday life, may
make a campaign more difﬁcult. Also, if the company or CEO is supposedly an
advocate for worker rights and safeguarding American jobs (as Koch claimed to
be), activists can use this against the company if it is not holding true to its mar-
keted image. This worked well in the campaign against New Era. However, when
the NLC tried to shame Disney Corporation for its labor abuses in Haiti in the mid-
1990s, the boycott had little success (Ross 1999). One reason was the commodity.
Unlike baseball caps, which have the brand-name tag on the inside and are indis-
tinguishable across brands on the outside, Disney products are uniquely Disney,
and easily identiﬁed as such. Another is the consumer base. The largest consumers
of Disney products (particularly toys) are children, and many parents feel guilty
about depriving their kids of the latest Disney rage (Ross 1999). Also, Disney CEO
Michael Eisner never presented himself as an ally of workers’ rights. Finally, and
perhaps most signiﬁcantly, USAS had not yet been formed and did not participate
in this campaign. What set the New Era victory apart from other, unsuccessful
struggles was the combination of structural factors, emerging opportunities, orga-
nizing tactics, the formation of social movement unionism, and a strong sense of
collective identity forged through a shared sense of moral outage that was at least
in part manifested through instrumental concerns.
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